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This brief is actually going to have two levels. One level will go 
with the advertised title, and I’ll tell you my current views on the 
truth about moral hazard and adverse selection. Adverse selection 
will serve as somewhat of a handmaid of moral hazard, as you 
will see. That’s one level. 
The other level, though, which continues to surprise me, is that 
these two topics—they’re two buzzwords from insurance 
theory—have generated an enormous amount of policy interest 
and, yes, passion. Some people passionately believe some things 
about moral hazard that others passionately disbelieve. And so as 
part of this second level I will draw back a bit from the actual 
subject matter to ask a kind of positive public policy question: 
Why is it that some people can get so passionate about a subject 
that seems fairly esoteric?  
Moral Hazard 
The perfect kind of insurance, to an economist, does one and only 
one thing: it transfers money from the lucky to the unlucky. 
Since, before the fact, you might be either one, you could say that 
it transfers wealth from the lucky state to the unlucky state, 
without affecting anything else.  
Moral hazard in insurance occurs when the expected 
loss from an adverse event increases as insurance 
coverage increases. Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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When moral hazard is present, insurance does more than just 
transfer money from one state to another. When people have 
insurance, their behavior changes in such a way that their 
expected expense is higher. 
Theoretically, if I have health insurance, I’m not going to bother 
to wear my sweater like my mother always told me or I’ll catch 
my death of cold, because it’s OK, the insurance will pay for my 
cold to be treated, and I’ll be my usual devil-may-care self. That 
may be what’s happening in health care. But a much more serious 
consequence, I think, of the presence of insurance compared to its 
absence, or of the presence of more generous insurance compared 
to less generous insurance, is that people with more generous 
insurance use more medical care, both in quantity and quality, 
compared to people with less generous insurance, even when they 
experience the same illness. 
In a sense, the phenomenon that we’re talking about, according to 
my father-in-law, who’s a retired GP, is manifested by what some 
of his patients would say to him. They’d say “That’s OK, doc, the 
insurance will pay for it.” That’s the sort of behavior that we’ll be 
talking about. 
The population that I want to focus on, one that is definitely 
subject to moral hazard and is also the hot potato in much of the 
policy debate, is the typical American, and the typical American 
is not covered by public insurance, not poor, and not sickly. 
There certainly are low-income people and people at high risk, 
but the great bulk of people with health insurance or who are 
contemplating having health insurance are not poor or high-risk. 
So the rhetorical question here is: Why all the fuss about health 
insurance? No one cares about other kinds of insurance, like the 
size of the deductible for auto collision coverage. But people do 
care about health insurance. That’s the dilemma. Mark V. Pauly 
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Cost Sharing 
Although various aspects of moral hazard have run through the 
health insurance debate over the years, at the moment the debate 
du jour involving moral hazard has to do with the so-called health 
savings account, or consumer-directed health plan, or, because 
those terms are kind of emotive and judgmental, what is called 
“high-deductible health insurance.” The primary purpose for 
offering high-deductible health insurance is to reduce moral 
hazard. I’ll explain why in just a minute. 
I have some friends who believe that cost-sharing is evil. It 
causes people to underuse medical care, which then ruins their 
health because they didn’t use the medical care they should. And 
it also causes them to expose themselves to financial ruin. 
Therefore, these friends oppose high-deductible health insurance. 
There are other people I know who sound just as reasonable 
when you talk to them in polite company, who will think of the 
same sort of phenomenon and come at it from 180 degrees 
opposite. They say that cost sharing is virtuous. It causes people 
to be frugal and wise in their use of medical care, and wise as 
well in their financial planning. They must have all had fathers 
like mine; whenever I had a problem my dad would say “You 
should have thought of that beforehand.” High-deductible health 
insurance is for that population. These people also tend to favor 
tax breaks for high-deductible health plans, along the lines of tax 
breaks in current law for health savings accounts and along the 
lines of some proposals that are made by, among others, 
President George W. Bush, to extend tax breaks to the premium 
for high-deductible health plans, as well as to the health savings 
accounts. 
Both groups of people agree, however, that whatever insurance 
people might choose on their own, the government should not 
accept that choice but rather should try to change it. The 
government should either do something to get people to choose 
insurance with lower levels of cost-sharing than they currently Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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would choose, if you’re in the first camp, or something to get 
them to choose higher levels of cost-sharing if you’re in the 
second camp. 
The simplest way to summarize my contrasting argument in a 
phrase is, I advocate aggressive neutrality. And so my view is 
that both views are wrong. For this population (non-poor, non-
sickly) there is an optimal level of cost-sharing, which involves 
neither free care nor enormous deductibles. This is the level, as 
I’ll explain a little more in detail in a moment, that would lead to 
an appropriate level of health and financial protection, balancing 
incentives to use care with incentives to provide financial 
protection. 
The view that people should be encouraged to have plans with 
high deductibles and high out-of-pocket payments I find 
questionable, because that may lead to a level of out-of-pocket 
payment in excess of the amount that people ought to 
appropriately choose. I also find arguments for very low levels of 
cost sharing, which will increase spending, to be questionable.  
My view is that the level of cost-sharing that this population of 
ordinary middle class people would choose, in the absence of 
either kind of government intervention—either a kind that 
encourages or discourages subsidies or taxes or regulation—is 
probably pretty close to the ideal level.  
For lower-income people or people at high risk I come to quite a 
different conclusion. We want to provide more insurance to low-
income and high-risk people than they might choose on their 
own, in order to actually create moral hazard to get them to use 
additional medical care. But for the bulk of the population, the 
general proposition that I want to argue is that incentives should 
be neutral, neither slanting the table toward high levels of cost-
sharing nor low levels of cost-sharing, basically letting people 
choose, given their own tastes, about how they would make 
various tradeoffs. Mark V. Pauly 
5 
The Problem of Imperfect Information 
Why is health insurance so complicated? Anything in real life is 
complicated, once you get into it, but there is at least a theoretical 
idea of how to offer insurance that wouldn’t have problems of 
either moral hazard or adverse selection. The problem is that the 
theoretical ideal isn’t practical this side of heaven.  
The theoretical ideal would be the following sort of insurance 
market: 
•  Imagine that consumers in general are knowledgeable 
about the marginal benefits from health care. They might spend 
all their time surfing on WebMD, and that’s why they know it. Or 
somewhat more practically, they might have kindly and 
unstressed primary care physicians who are able to explain to 
them the benefits and costs and risks of various levels of health 
care consumption.  
•  And imagine as well that insurers know everything about 
you and, when you get sick, know how sick you are. So the 
insurer knows how bad your backache is, how frequent your 
urination is, how much it really itches, and therefore can 
determine and define a state of health. 
The theoretically perfect insurance would take the following 
form: the insurance that I would get would say, Mark, if you have 
a really bad back, here’s a check for $20,000. If it’s just creaking 
a bit here’s a check for $500, and if it’s really just because you 
did too much work in the garden over the weekend, here’s a 
check for $2, enough to buy a small bottle of Excedrin. Coverage 
would take the form of indemnities. The person would decide 
beforehand how much medical care in each state of health 
represents the amount at which the benefit is greater than the 
cost. What’s the quantity at which the marginal benefit just 
equals the cost? That’s the amount of medical care I want to 
have, recognizing that if I consume more than that, I will have to 
pay for it in higher premiums. So I would prefer an insurance 
policy that gave me a check that would, in each illness state, Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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purchase just the amount of medical care that is economically 
efficient for me to have, and—remember I’m fully informed—the 
amount up to the point where marginal benefit just equals 
marginal cost. In that case there wouldn’t be any moral hazard, 
because, whether I have insurance or not, setting aside some 
small income effects, I would consume the same amount of care. 
I would not buy units of medical care beyond the amount of the 
check if I would have to pay for them 100% myself. 
Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is the tendency for people with 
higher-risk (health expectations) to obtain insurance 
coverage to a greater extent than persons with lesser-risk 
(health expectations), because insurers are unable to tell 
who’s high-risk and who’s low-risk.  
When private insurers try to offer policies charging premiums 
that will cover all their costs, the rate for those high-risk people 
may be inadequate. In particular, the people who are high-risk, 
known to themselves but unbeknownst to the insurer, show up 
and say “I want the most generous policy you’ve got.” Whereas 
the people who are low-risk, especially if they wait a while to see 
how much the premium increases because all of those high-risk 
people got there before them, will say “If I want any insurance at 
all, I want it to be very minimal and very frugal, not because I 
don’t like insurance and not because I’m not interested in 
protecting myself from risk, but rather because it’s so much more 
expensive in premium relative to what I would expect to get 
back.” 
Its connection to moral hazard is this:  the opponents of high 
cost-sharing are worried not only that high cost-sharing plans 
may cause people to underuse medical care, but also because the 
high cost-sharing plans may draw off from the risk pool the 
people who otherwise would have been low-risk and leave in the 
risk pool only the high-risk people. So although there are a lot of 
reasons to worry about adverse selection, the primary reason to Mark V. Pauly 
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worry about it in this brief is because of its impact on the demand 
for high-deductible insurance or other types of limited coverage. 
Perfect knowledge also solves the adverse selection problem. 
Imagine that insurers can also tell by looking at you what your 
risk level is. Imagine by looking at you or hooking you up to the 
appropriate piece of equipment insurers could tell what risk level 
you are. Then insurers could offer low premiums to the low-risks 
and high premiums to the high-risks. The proposition in 
economics is they would all be willing to buy insurance as long 
as the administrative cost was not too high. The alternative to 
paying somewhat more for insurance, if you’re at somewhat high 
risk, is not paying nothing, it is having to face the same 
distribution as out-of-pocket expenses, which is a terrible thing to 
have happen. So you’d prefer insurance. 
The sweeping generalization here is, if insurers were omniscient 
and people were knowledgeable, everybody would have just that 
kind of insurance that induces them to use care to the point where 
benefits are greater than costs. Out-of-pocket costs would be 
close to zero, because no one would spend much more than the 
indemnity amount. That would be the best of all possible worlds, 
at least as far as the economist is concerned, for the non-poor 
non-sickly. 
For people who are low-income, or high-risk, just to elaborate a 
bit more on the subtext here, there is a kind of altruistic 
externality motivation, which is economist jargon for the good 
Samaritan, the feeling that when we see suffering by our fellow 
human beings we feel predisposed to do something to alleviate it, 
at least up to a point. That’s why we want to have additional 
insurance coverage for low-income and high-risk people. But for 
those of us who are relatively well off and relatively healthy, my 
argument would be that there probably is not much altruistic 
concern about underuse of care. The average American may 
underuse some kinds of care and overuse others but, on average, 
he or she probably uses enough care. Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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The Optimal Level of Cost Sharing 
What is the primary motivation to buy insurance? In economics it 
is to protect yourself from financial risk. Otherwise, if the bad 
thing happens and I get unlucky, there’s a big hit to my 
checkbook. And when it comes to health care that hit can be big 
and is getting bigger every day. The fundamental reason to have 
health insurance, at least from the economic viewpoint, is to 
protected yourself from financial risk. Moral hazard means that 
the consequence of protecting yourself against financial risk is to 
stimulate the use of additional medical care, which by definition 
is medical care that is not worth what it costs, because if it was 
worth what it cost you would have bought it even if you didn’t 
have insurance. That’s the dilemma—that insurance, by 
disguising the price, makes expensive things look cheap. 
The way to describe the optimal extent of cost-sharing in this 
kind of world is to think of the following choice calculus: 
•  Imagine you start with no insurance. For the first 1% of 
coverage, the benefit is great in terms of risk protection, because 
otherwise you might have a five-figure hospital bill, and at least 
you’ll get 1% of it covered by insurance. In economic theory, that 
may predispose you to use a little bit more medical care if you’re 
paying $.99 on the dollar than if you’re paying $1.00 on the 
dollar, but the difference in value between that additional care 
and its cost is quite small. So you go for the first 1%. 
•  At the other end of the spectrum, you’ve got 99% 
coverage and you’re thinking of adding the last 1%. That 1% 
coverage is hardly protecting your financial risk because you’ve 
got virtually complete coverage to begin with. On the other hand, 
if it induces you and your physician to agree on some additional, 
more intensive treatment, that unit of care will only be worth $.01 
on the dollar. That’s what economists call a welfare cost.  
•  Optimal cost-sharing is finding a happy medium, the level 
of cost sharing between 1% and 99%, where the additional risk 
protection is just balanced against the additional stimulus to use Mark V. Pauly 
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care whose benefit-to-cost ratio is less than one. That level of 
cost sharing would be optimum. 
There are two comments I would make about this level of cost-
sharing that I think may be relevant to the policy debate. One is 
to point out that in this particular story that I’m telling, the health 
care that you give up because of cost-sharing isn’t useless. The 
reason it’s not useless is because you’re a well-informed 
consumer and you wouldn’t have used useless care in any case. 
Instead, you’re induced to give up care that is worth something to 
you, but not as valuable as the cost that you’re going to save. 
Cost-sharing saves more money than it hurts health, but it does 
hurt health. What you seek is a happy balance, a happy medium. 
There’s also a tradeoff between risk protection and expected cost. 
The addition of beneficial but not cost-beneficial care under 
moral hazard for this population of high-income non-sickly 
people is not to be praised, and the loss of care is not to be 
decried. Having said all that, though, when I go home and talk to 
my family, I do feel a little uncomfortable saying “Yeah, it’s 
actually a good thing for people to go without beneficial medical 
care, because it costs too much money.” But the health sacrificed 
under cost-sharing in theory should be small relative to the cost 
reduction. 
Empirical Research 
There has been research, some very old and some quite new, to 
find out empirically what happens when people have more or less 
generous health insurance or, in one case, when they have health 
insurance compared to no health insurance. 
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
The mother lode of information on empirical estimates of moral 
hazard is a 15-year-long study that was begun in 1971 by the 
RAND Corporation with funding from the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health 
and Human Services). The Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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was a study to determine the impact of health insurance on health 
care spending and health outcomes using as close as social 
scientists could get to a randomized controlled trial. The HIE 
involved approximately 2,000 non-elderly families from six 
different areas of the United States, which were assigned to one 
of 14 fee-for-service insurance plans with various 
(a) coinsurance, or cost-sharing, rates and (b) maximum dollar 
expenditures (MDE), or cap on out-of-pocket expenditures, for 
medical care services (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment 
Group 1993). There was free care at one extreme, because one 
purpose of the HIE was to estimate expenditures under full and 
free national health insurance, which everybody was sure was 
just around the corner. At the other extreme was an insurance 
policy with 95% cost-sharing up to about 10% of a family’s 
income (catastrophic coverage). The sample was largely middle 
class. Families in that group got a nickel when they sent their 
bills to the insurance company, which was mostly to compensate 
them for bothering to submit their bills so that researchers could 
track their health care expenditures. There were also intermediate 
levels of cost-sharing, 50% and 25%. (There was also a fifteenth 
plan called the individual deductible which I’m not going to talk 
about.)  
Table 1. Annual Use of Medical Services per Capita, by Plan 
Plan 
Likelihood 













Free 86.8  $446  4.55  10.3 $982 
25% 78.7  341  3.33 8.4  831 
50% 77.2  294  3.03 7.2  884 
95% 67.7  266  2.73 7.9  679 
Individual 
Deductible 72.3  $308  3.02  9.6  $797 
Source: Newhouse et al. 1993, Table 3.2, p. 41. 
Table 1 summarizes the impact of different amounts of cost-
sharing on the use of medical care. In the last column, the people 
with 95% cost-sharing spent about $700 per year on average, in 
1991 dollars, or about $1,200 in current dollars, while the people 
with free care spent about $1,000 per year (about $1,600 in 
current dollars). An increase of somewhere between 30% and Mark V. Pauly 
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40% in medical care spending was associated with free insurance. 
As you can see, there was one exception at the 50% level, but 
basically there was a graduated effect. Cost-sharing clearly does 
cause people to be more frugal.  
The HIE also put enormous effort into documenting the impact of 
these lower levels of use of medical care on health outcomes. 
They concluded that for the bulk of the population in the 
experiment—the 94% who were not low-income and high-risk—
there was little or no measurable effect on health outcome for any 
of the cost-sharing plans compared to free care, except that 
people with free care kept their eyeglasses up-to-date and their 
oral health was a bit better. But that was about it. 
However, for low-income people initially at high risk, especially 
at high risk for high blood pressure, there was definitely an 
adverse effect of cost-sharing on health outcomes. The 
economists who were part of the HIE would say that the adverse 
effect could have been prevented by targeted screening without 
making care free for everybody for everything. The opponents of 
high-deductible health plans will say, and it is true, that the HIE 
found that people who paid cost-sharing were more likely to 
forego effective medical care. But the basic message that I take 
away from the HIE is that for the relatively low-risk there does 
not appear to be a drastically adverse impact of reduced use of 
medical care, as a result of cost-sharing, on health outcomes. 
ER Visits by Plan 
One part of the HIE looked at the impact of cost-sharing versus 
free care on overall visits to emergency rooms, and ER visits by 
diagnosis. The diagnoses were categorized as more urgent and 
less urgent by a panel of emergency room department physicians.  
The HIE found that ER use related to the more urgent diagnoses 
was 23% lower on any of the cost-sharing plans than on the free 
plan, and the number of ER visits continued to decline as the 
level of cost-sharing increased. However, ER use involving the 
less urgent diagnoses was 47% lower on the cost-sharing plans Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
12 
than the free plan, and most of the observed response occurred 
between free care and the 25% cost-sharing plan. This says that 
when people have to pay a lot out-of-pocket they are much less 
likely to make use of the emergency room for conditions which 
were labeled by the authors as less urgent, but still nearly as 
likely to make use of the emergency room for those more urgent 
conditions. That’s the good news. 
Table 2. Response to Plans, by Diagnosisa 
Annual ER Visits per 10,000 Persons 
Diagnosis 
Cost-Sharing Plans (25%, 
50%, 95%, Individual 
Deductible)  Free Plan 
Visits on Cost-
Sharing Plans as a 
Proportion of Visits 
on Free Plan 
More urgent diagnoses      
Fracture/dislocation 134  168  0.80 
Miscellaneous serious 
traumab 57  67  0.85 
Asthma 30  83  0.36 
Otitis media  40  78  0.51 
Chest pain/acute heart 
disease 59  57  1.04 
Cellulitis/abscess/wound 
infection  36 39  0.92 
Surgical abdominal 
diseasec 42  38  1.11 
Head injury  36  33  1.09 
Urinary tract infection  22  43  0.51 
Acute eye injury/infection  34  34  1.01 
Obstetrical 29  31  0.94 
Allergic reaction  26  26  1.00 
Acute alcohol/drug 
related 27  20  1.35 
Burn, second 
degree/complicated 19  22  0.86 
Visits with any of the 
above diagnoses  991  1280  0.77d 
Less urgent diagnoses      
Abrasion/contusion 228  403  0.54 
Sprain 164  249  0.63 
Upper respiratory 
infection 92  190  0.51 
Influenza/viral syndrome  40  61  0.65 
Gastroenteritis/diarrhea 36  67 0.62 
Abdominal pain (no other 
diagnosis) 34  65  0.53 
Back/neck pain  32  67  0.45 Mark V. Pauly 
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Arthritis/bursitis 30  63  0.45 
Headache 8  59  0.11 
Acute bronchitis  14  36  0.42 
Burn, first degree  7  28  0.28 
Visits involving only the 
above diagnoses  663  1185  0.53d 
Notes: 
a. Equal partial weights were used to count visits involving multiple diagnoses. For example, if a 
visit resulted in three diagnoses, each diagnosis was credited with one-third of a visit.  
b. Includes foreign bodies, ingestions, ligamentous ruptures, and internal, neurovascular, and 
crush injuries. 
c. Includes cholecystitis, gastrointestinal bleeding, appendicitis, intestinal obstruction, and peptic 
ulcer disease. 
d. p < 0.01 for the difference between cost-sharing plans and the free plan, and for the 
difference between visits involving more urgent diagnoses and visits involving only less urgent 
diagnoses. 
Source: Newhouse et al. 1993, table 5.3, pp. 155-156. 
Ambulatory Care (Office) Visits by Plan 
The potentially bad news, though, is in Table 3. Physicians who 
were part of the HIE team grouped several health conditions into 
four categories by the effectiveness of the medical care with 
which they could be treated (in the 1970s): highly effective, quite 
effective, less effective, and rarely effective or self-care effective. 
This table reports the rate of use of medical care in normal office 
practice, by medical effectiveness and insurance plan.  
Table 3. Predicted Percentages of Adults and Children with an Episode of Care, by Medical Effectiveness 
Categories and Plan 
Adults (N=3,543)  Children (N=1,830)  Medical Care 
Effectiveness 




as % of Free  Free  Cost Sharing 
Cost Sharing 
as % of Free 
Highly Effective             
 Acute  28.4  19.0  67a 32.0  23.1  72a 
 Acute/Chronic  16.8  13.3  79a 19.4  16.1  83 
 Chronic  12.6  10.7  85  4.7  2.4  52a 
Quite Effective  23.2  17.6  76a 22.4  17.6  79a 
Less Effective  25.0  18.6  74a 12.9  9.7  76 
Rarely Effective  10.5  7.4  70a  5.1  3.4  67 
Rarely Effective 
but Self-Care 
Effective  38.8 29.2  75a 35.6  23.9  67a 
Notes: 
a. Effect of cost sharing significant at p < 0.05. 
Source: Newhouse et al. 1993, table 5.10, p. 166. Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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If we take just the rarely effective and self-care effective 
category, there’s a 25% percent reduction in use for adults and 
33% reduction in children between the free and cost-sharing 
plans. If you agree with the HIE physicians that the care is indeed 
rarely effective or that self-care would be effective, this reduction 
in use might not worry you much (see Newhouse et al. 1993, 
Table 5.7 for the conditions within each category). But the impact 
of cost-sharing on use was roughly the same proportion for care 
that was categorized as highly effective. So it is literally true that 
cost-sharing caused a reduction in the use of highly effective 
care. 
Insurance vs. No Insurance (Pauly 2005) 
Taking this analysis one step further, we looked at the effect of 
the presence or complete absence of insurance coverage on 
medical care spending and health outcomes for non-poor young 
women ages 21 to 40, using data from the 1996 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey. There are two sets of dependent 
variables. One measures the amount of care used, in terms of 
money spent on health care and visits to physicians’ offices or 
hospital outpatient departments. The second measures health 
status or health outcomes, in terms of whether the person’s self-
reported health status was fair or poor, and the number of chronic 
conditions. We also used the person’s response to a question of 
whether she went without care that was needed for health. 
















OLSa 4.48b 2.43b -0.75b 0.05 0.21 
IVc 10.4b 3.52 -5.94b 2.05  -0.76 
Notes: 
a. Single-equation or ordinary least-squares estimates. 
b. Statistically significant at 0.05. 
c. Instrumental-variables estimates. 
Source: Pauly 2005. Mark V. Pauly 
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This study, I must say, didn’t turn out the way I had hoped, but 
maybe it turned out the way I expected. Table 4 shows that for 
both the use of medical care and total spending, the people with 
insurance had substantially more total spending and outpatient 
visits than the people without insurance. The people with 
insurance were also much less likely to report going without 
needed care. However, we couldn’t find any connection, 
statistically speaking, between having or not having insurance 
and self-reported health status or the presence of chronic 
conditions. 
Does Insurance-affected Care Matter? 
If people with cost-sharing forego effective care, at least some of 
the time, why is there no appreciable measured impact on their 
health outcomes, in either the RAND study or my study? 
Let me start with the least likely answer and work my way up. 
The explanation actually offered, somewhat tongue in cheek but 
perhaps not, by some of the medical researchers on the RAND 
project, was that unnecessary care may harm health: something 
like “Maybe that care that you were induced to use because it was 
free had adverse side effects which harmed your health enough to 
wipe out the beneficial effects that you got from the essential care 
that you were induced to use.” It would be a sad story about 
American medicine, but it could be true. 
A second possibility, which is even more esoteric, is that within 
the medical care effectiveness categorizations, assuming that they 
have legitimacy—and I think they do, at least they were vetted by 
a lot of physicians and public health specialists—care with high 
average effectiveness may also display a large range of low 
marginal benefits. Then, too, perhaps the clinical judgments are 
flawed. 
Here are two possible explanations that I’m betting on most at the 
moment. Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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•  Imagine that consumers actually don’t really have good 
information at all. They know that medical care is good, but they 
guess that the average benefit from a dollar spent on medical care 
is the same regardless of the kind of care. They would still 
choose to use less medical care with cost-sharing than without, 
because eventually they would prefer to save their income to pay 
for other consumption, as opposed to spending it on medical care. 
But that might explain why they reduce care proportionately 
across the board; they don’t know what’s high-benefit and what’s 
low-benefit. 
•  The health measures are insensitive. In fact, studies that 
have been done of some of the greatest and most effective 
medical interventions—like using statins to reduce high 
cholesterol and beta blockers to reduce high blood pressure—can 
show statistically significant impacts on deaths from those 
particular diseases. But if we look at the overall health level of 
the people who got the statins or the beta blocker, do they live 
longer in general? The answer oftentimes is no. Sometimes this is 
because of competing risks; if you don’t get your heart attack you 
may die on your motorcycle. And sometimes it may just be noise 
in the data.  
My Current Views 
On Moral Hazard and Cost Sharing 
•  Cost sharing does cause a reduction in the quantity and 
quality of care that would be mildly beneficial to middle-class 
people of average health. It saves enough to make this a desirable 
tradeoff. 
•  The current tax subsidy for health insurance premiums 
pushes this tradeoff in the direction of inefficiency (second best) 
by encouraging excess insurance coverage with excess moral 
hazard. 
The best strategy that I see for government to take in helping 
people choose their health insurance is to be aggressively neutral, Mark V. Pauly 
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to basically say to people: “Perhaps we want to encourage you 
and to give you a small tax break, for catastrophic coverage, 
because in the RAND experiment everybody had catastrophic 
coverage. But beyond catastrophic coverage we will not change 
your taxes or regulations to try to push you one way or another. 
It’s up to you, person, to decide how you want to make this 
tradeoff between risk protection and additional medical care use.” 
Personally, I’d probably go for the low cost-sharing plan, because 
my view is life’s too short to spend all your time worrying about 
economizing on medical care. But if somebody wanted to choose 
a high-deductible health plan, I’d be willing to let them do it. 
The logical thing to do if you could get sufficient data would be 
to use cost-sharing to encourage people to use medical care that 
does in truth have high marginal benefit, and discourage care 
with low marginal benefit. You could design health insurance 
policies with what’s called benefits-based cost-sharing: lower 
cost-sharing for the highly effectively things that consumers seem 
to underuse, like the beta blockers, and raise cost-sharing for the 
things that consumers seem to overuse. And try to encourage 
people to move in the right direction. 
No one has ever argued that moral hazard is a reason why 
someone should remain totally uninsured. We should have 
catastrophic coverage for all. Low-income people should not be 
subject to cost sharing in general. Beyond that, moral hazard is a 
phenomenon to be managed, and it should be managed well by 
competitive insurers offering a range of plans to consumers, in a 
neutral way. 
On Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is caused by imperfect insurer information 
about risk. From an economic perspective, the efficient structure 
is perfect risk rating. But policy makers do not like risk rating: 
they seek “markets” in which everyone buys generous insurance, 
even though the premium is uniform, e.g., community rating. 
Most of us in our normal lives would like insurance that’s what Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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you might call a reverse Lake Woebegone, where everybody pays 
less than average for their insurance. But we know that’s not 
possible. Here in New York State I talk about community rating 
with some trepidation, but the basic message from economic 
theory is that the best strategy, the way to get as many people as 
possible to buy health insurance, is to have premiums tailored to 
people’s risk level. Then, the low-risks would buy. Even the 23-
year-old immortals would buy, if we got health insurance 
premiums for them down close to the level of their expected 
expense, although we might need to run a series of commercials, 
“This is your brain without health insurance,” to persuade them. 
But the middle class high-risks would still buy insurance because 
it’s better to have insurance than to be uninsured if you should 
get sick.  
We do have some examples of adverse selection in health 
insurance, but the great bulk of them have occurred when the 
market was interfered with, and where adverse selection arose not 
from some decentralized competitive world but rather from 
tampering with what would otherwise be the operation of 
competitive markets. 
Exhibit A for that kind of market tampering, Medigap coverage 
for prescription drugs, is out of date now, thank goodness. The 
calculations around that kind of insurance went something like 
this. The typical policy would cover prescription drugs up to a 
maximum payment of $1,100 a year. The premium that Medigap 
insurers had to charge to break even was over $900. So that tells 
you that almost everybody who bought that insurance used the 
whole $1,100, which is not the average drug expense for a person 
over age 65. Clearly, people who were likely to use drugs could 
and did buy that insurance, because Medigap did not permit the 
insurer to charge a higher premium to people who were already 
using more expensive medicines than average. Medigap was 
trying to be nice to those high-risk people, but it ended up not 
being all that helpful because it was charging them almost as 
much as they were going to get in benefits. And the low-risk 
people dropped out entirely. Mark V. Pauly 
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That’s the rationale for a politically incorrect statement: that 
community rating is a foolish and inefficient way to subsidize 
lower income high-risks. I do believe there are reasons why we 
might want to subsidize them, but we should use general taxes to 
raise money for subsidies to high-risks and then make transfers to 
them. 
There are some interesting ways to limit adverse selection. I’ll 
just talk about three of them here. 
1.  The most obvious one would be risk rating based on good 
information. It turns out that other circumstances in which we 
have seen adverse selection have been in private sector settings 
where, for some reason, health economists usually study 
university health insurance plans, and when universities 
incorrectly set the premium differential between the high-
generosity plan and the high-deductible plan, everybody left the 
generous plan and went to the high-deductible plan, or at least a 
lot of people did. Or in some cases the calculations were just 
anticipating that this would occur, and being very upset about the 
prospect. 
A well-managed benefits department with good actuarial and 
statistical consultation can figure out how to set the premium 
differential for the low-cost high-deductible plan to make sure 
that it’s not inefficiently attractive to high-risks. One way to keep 
high-deductible health plans from totally wiping out the risk pool 
in employment-based group insurance is to make sure that you 
set the reward for joining the high-deductible plan at a level 
appropriate to the risk level of the people who are choosing it, not 
the average risk difference. That will get choices to be made 
more efficiently (though not perfectly). 
2.  There is a provision in individual insurance called guaranteed 
renewability at class average premiums. If you buy individual 
insurance in most states, in effect your premium has two parts. 
One part of your premium will pay your expenses for next year. 
But because the insurer has promised if you renew they will sell Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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you coverage at the same premium as they’re charging everybody 
else, the insurer charges an extra premium to collect enough 
money from you to cover the difference between the premium if 
you become a high-risk and the lower premium that they would 
charge you in the future. This is a market solution to deal with 
what I think is the main reason why we are really worried about 
adverse selection: the fear that “What if I became a high-risk 
unexpectedly and not entirely by my own fault?” Risk averse 
people want to avoid risk reclassification. Guaranteed 
renewability can prevent that. If you have bought a policy with 
guaranteed renewability then there is no way for an insurer to 
come in and pick you off if you’re a low risk, no way for adverse 
selection to occur. And if you’re a high risk, there’s no reason to 
try to buy a more generous policy because you’ve got the best 
possible policy you can have. 
Is there evidence of large scale adverse selection in competitive 
health insurance markets? Cardon and Hendel (2001), using data 
on single employed individuals (18 to 65 years old) from the 
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), said no. So I 
don’t lie awake nights, worrying about adverse selection for the 
bulk of the population. I do worry about those low-income high-
risk people. 
Conclusions 
•  Given such imperfect information as we have, we should 
use cost-sharing carefully but bravely.  
•  Control of moral hazard for the average person is unlikely 
to be harmful if coverage is chosen based on neutral tax 
incentives.  
•  If tax incentives are distorted, and either encourage or 
discourage cost-sharing, it’s likely to be harmful.  
•  Adverse selection can be tamed in most settings, though it 
probably cannot be totally prevented. Direct subsidies to Mark V. Pauly 
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coverage for low-income high-risk people is better than premium 
regulation.  
•  And low-income high-risk people do need generous 
coverage, but the rest of us should only have it if we’re willing to 
pay its true cost. 
Proposals for the Political Debate 
There is an inevitable temptation for policy makers to not only 
review insurance policies but to decide what kind of insurance 
policy they think makes sense, and then slant subsidies in favor 
of that policy. We need to tell the people in Congress, “You 
weren’t elected to be a cheerleader or an insurance salesman. 
You were elected to offer efficient incentives to your constituents 
to choose what makes sense.” I certainly don’t want any 
Republican designing my health insurance, much less a 
Democrat. So the basic message here would be to try to be 
neutral. Here’s my proposal for the political debate. 
We should agree that neither better health nor cost-containment is 
unmitigatedly good. We need the right mix. I know this is 
economics talking, but I’m programmed to say it. And no one 
knows what that right mix is, in part because we don’t know how 
insurance affects health. 
I think we should agree on the distribution of total taxes first and 
then decide what the rich should pay, and how much help the 
poor and the non-poor should get.  
We should take encouraging increased cost-sharing for lower-
income people off the table. My biggest fear about high-
deductible health plans and health savings accounts is that a few 
low-income people might be induced to choose them. I guess I’d 
rather have them have a high-deductible plan than no insurance at 
all, but that certainly wouldn’t be my most preferred plan for a 
low-income person. Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
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Rather than have high-deductible health plans tax-subsidized, I 
would instead limit the tax incentive that’s offered to high-
income people to induce them to choose plans with low levels of 
cost-sharing, which would go along with the cap. 
And finally, for the lower-income or high-risk people: 
•  We should subsidize generous coverage with a 
predetermined tax credit of an amount large enough to make 
choosing the right policy a reasonable choice. 
•  Regulate those qualified policies lightly, at least in the 
beginning, because we want to make sure people get some 
insurance, and as we know from the RAND experiment, even a 
relatively high cost-sharing plan can yield as high a level of 
health outcome as a more generous one. 
•  Consider denying tax breaks for high-deductible health 
plans to lower-income people so they aren’t tempted. 
•  Make sure there’s a much better alternative for low-
income high-risk people, and be passionate about that. 
It’s important to focus passion, I guess, for cost-effective 
deployment of passion. For a health economist that would be the 
best of all possible worlds. 
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